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THE PEOPLE AND THE COURT. By Charles L. Black, Jr. The Macmillan Com-
pany, 1960. Pp. vii, 238. $5.00.
THIS book is both a timely and conspicuously able defense of judicial review
as exercised by the Supreme Court of the United States. It is in refreshing
contrast with the intemperate attacks, of recent memory, which have been
made upon the Court and its performance of the function of judicial review.
Public understanding of the Court's crucial role in the operation of the con-
stitutional system is of great importance to the continued vitality of the in-
stitution of judicial review. A well-reasoned compact presentation of the case
for judicial review is indeed a welcome contribution to public understanding.
This reviewer looks with high favor upon the author's principal conclusions
and upon the rational stuff of the book. He is not troubled by the fact that the
work is not a full-fledged historical or expository treatment. He observes with-
out criticism that the author has frankly assumed the role of an advocate and
relied much more upon reasoned arguments than upon authority and scholarly
documentation. He is afraid, however, that the book may not communicate to
the general reader, not learned in the law, with the desired effectiveness. It is
no affront to the reader to act on the assumption that introductory and inter-
stitial briefing is needed to enable him to achieve a good grasp of judicial re-
view.
Professor Black does try, in an initial chapter, to orient his reader in the
"basics of judicial review." He refers at once to current challenges to the place
of the judiciary in our constitutional structure, one in the form of proposed
congressional legislation to limit the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and
another in the form of urging by legal scholars and commentators that the
Court exercise judicial self-restraint. His concern is with the second of these.
This is understandable, but bare mention of possible congressional action and
a brief later acknowledgment that Congress could take from the Court all
appellate jurisdiction do not add up to enough informing of the reader about
the character and possibilities of the legislative mode of attack. It would not
take lengthy exposition to describe recent piecemeal efforts in Congress to re-
strict the appellate jurisdiction of the Court with respect to certain areas of
public concern.1 (The author does give attention -to this in his final chapter.)
Nor would extended statement be required to spell out the constitutional basis
for congressional authority over the appellate jurisdiction of the Court, and to
take into account the suggestion of able scholars that congressional authority
1. One has in mind particularly the so-called Jenner-Butler Bill, S. 2646, 85th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1958). It died in the Senate after major surgery in committee.
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may not be unlimited.2 On that front, moreover, notice could be taken of the
proposal from within the legal profession that the Court's appellate jurisdic-
tion in constitutional cases be put beyond legislative reach by constitutional
amendment.3
Even with respect to the second mode of attack, to which the book is avowed-
ly a reaction, the reader is not told who are the contemporary spokesmen for
judicial self-restraint, nor given an indication of the strength of the forces they
may be said to represent. Only Judge Learned Hand is identified.4 Thus, it is
not made to appear just what the magnitude of the attack upon judicial review
in the Court may be.
The orientation chapter contains a brief statement about the dual court sys-
tem in the country. It tells the reader that the Court has final power to deter-
mine all questions of federal law, which includes the law of the Federal Con-
stitution, whether the questions arise in a federal or a state court.,; It does not
treat the effect upon a statute of an adverse decision upon constitutionality,
the distinction between review as of right on appeal and discretionary review
through certiorari,7 nor the historic challenge to the power of the Court to re-
view judgments of state courts of last resort.
8
Certain basic points are made. The Constitution by its own direct declara-
tion in the supremacy clause is a kind of law. This is supported by other in-
ternal features of the document and has prevailed, as everyone knows, in our
system. The Constitution, being law, may be invoked in lawsuits by litigants.
The Constitution is higher law to which statutory law is subordinate. This is
clear enough from the explicit prohibitions upon certain kinds of legislation,
such as ex post facto laws. The function of the courts to declare and apply the
law extends, then, to the Constitution. This means that the courts must inter-
2. HART & WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEIm 292 (1953) ;
Ratner, Congressional Power Over the Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, 109
U. PA. L. Rav. 157 (1960).
3. The proposal has recently been put forward afresh. See Report of Committee on
Federal Legislation, 15 RECORD OF THE NEW YORK CITY BAR AssoCIATION, No. 7, Co.sM.
REP. Supp. 34 (1960). This writer prefers to take the risk of legislative restriction of the
appellate jurisdiction involved in retaining the present pattern in which the people's rep-
resentatives have supported the institution of judicial review. Fordham, The Legal Pro-
fession and American Constitutionalism, 12 RECORD OF THE NEW YORK CITY BAR Asso-
ciAT oN 518, 533-36 (1957). "-
4., HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 7, 28 (1958).
5. The author, p. 5, refers to review of action of the highest court in a state judicial
system. Actually it is the highest court in which a decision in the suit could be. had, and
thismay b a verymiferior {'ibnJ* . .
6. Itshould be explained to the layman that'an 'adverse decision on c6nstitutionality
does not have the effect of a repeal or complete nullification. See Chicot County Drainage
Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371 (1941) ; Jawish v. Morlet, 86 A.2d 96 (D.C.
Munic. Ct. App. 1952). --
-7., Thii bears, of course, ution the access of litigants to the Court.
8. See Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U-S.-(1 Wheat.) -304 ,(1816);,B#V.1rr, Bru.rm.i
& HoNOLD, CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 26 (1959).
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pret the instrument. It must be given effect in court if it is to prevail as law
and its broad language is not self-interpreting. So far as the litigants are con-
cerned, interpretation adverse to a statute may result in simple judicial refusal
to enforce the statute or the granting of affirmative redress despite the legis-
lation, as the case might be. While not so plain, it is yet clear enough that the
other departments must defer to judicial interpretation of the Constitution,
since deference must be paid to judgments of courts on all matters of law if
government is to function within a genuine legal framework.
Mr. Black refers to the insistence of critics of judicial review that to justify
the exercise of the power it must be demonstrated beyond peradventure that
"a majority of the delegates at the [Constitutional] Convention believed judi-
cial review to be established by the Constitution.",, He says that this is absurd,
that on such a matter of implication, which was not discussed in the Conven-
tion as a subject in chief, no such demonstration is possible, but that one can
get somewhere in trying to see where the preponderance of the evidence lies.
Telling confirmation of this is found in the famous Section 25 of the Judiciary
Act of 1789, which recognized that a state court might pass upon a federal
constitutional question as to a state or federal act of government and express-
ly provided for Supreme Court review of state judgments adverse to the claim
based on the Constitution. In the very process of organizing the government
under the new constitution, the political branches gave this statutory recog-
nition to judicial review in a section which, in modified form, remains the law
to this day.10
Reference might well have been made to the routine recognition of judicial
review which has been accorded by Congress and all the state legislatures in
the form of the well-nigh ubiquitous separability clause. The same is true of
the universal acceptance of judicial review within the state framework, further
confirmation of the philosophic and practical commitment to judicial review in
the American constitutional system."
The way lawyers talk at bar association meetings about legal ideas and
processes is one thing, the way they employ those ideas and processes in their
professional work is another. So it is with judicial review. We are disposed
to discuss the subject in negative terms, yet we do not operate strictly that
way. Nothing is more practical than the familiar test suit, so common in the
field of local government, in which it is hoped that a favorable decision on
troubling constitutional questions will be made. A favorable ruling will provide
the desired validation or legitimization.1
2
Professor Black deals with this side of the judicial review coin admirably.
He does it, moreover, not in pragmatic terms but on the more fundamental
9. The words are those of Mr. Black. He cites Hand as one who embraces the point.
HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTs 7, 28 (1958).
10. 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1958).
11. It is common learning that at the state level social and economic legislation is
under greater risk of invalidation than is true at the federal level.
12. See, e.g., Castevens v. Shelby County, 211 N.C. 642, 191 S.E. 739 (1937).
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level of the problem of power in a limited constitutional government. "What
a government of limited powers needs, at the beginning and forever, is some
means of satisfying the people that it has taken all steps humanly possible to
stay within its powers."' 3 The needed means in the American system is, of
course, judicial review exercised in the final analysis by the Supreme Court.
From the standpoint of the reach and effectiveness of governmental power
in dealing with the problems of a great and growing nation both in its earlier
and more mature stages of development, this process of legitimatizing is of the
greatest significance. It is easy to see, in retrospect, that the national govern-
ment would have been handcuffed by a strict constructionist interpretation of
general provisions such as the commerce clause. It is manifest now, as Mr.
Black observes, that in the clash during the Washington Administration over
strict and liberal construction, Hamilton was right and Jefferson was wrong.
Today strict constructionism is espoused only selectively and to support policy
positions. There was and continues to be debatable ground. The political
branches have occupied much of it. The Court has performed the validating
function.
Mr. Black reviews at some length the notable instance of the validation of
the New Deal by the Court. He does not exclude the possibility that judicial
review might constitute such a resistant obstacle to national need as to justify
what would in substance be revolutionary legislation by Congress to subvert
it. He thinks, however, that we were no where close to that point in 1937. As
he puts it:
Many expedients of legislative draftsmanship were still untried. It was
as yet quite unclear whether Roberts and Hughes would really go all the
way down the line with the four irreconcilables, or whether, on the other
hand, without any "switching" at all, as a result merely of their appre-
hension of lawyers' distinctions, they would have voted to validate some
measures which, while not ideally constructed from the point of view of
policy, would have sufficed to avert catastrophe. The death of one of the
conservative Justices, as it turned out, was only two years in the future
in 1937, and it is uncertain how long the other three, all old men, could
have continued to sit on the Court.14
A chapter is devoted to the negative or checking aspect of judicial review.
Mr. Black lays great store by it as "the practical embodiment, given us by
history, of the idea, indigenous to us and basic in our political thought, of
binding legal limitation on the power of immediately elected government." He
speaks with felicity of judicial review as "the people's institutionalized means
of self-control."' 5
He is impatient with unidentified advocates of across-the-board judicial






invoked must be taken into account. In the case of a challenge to a statute on
the ground that Congress has exceeded its delegated powers, appropriate judi-
cial restraint is embodied in a liberal interpretation approach. Again, where
an asserted implied limitation on legislative power is invoked, the Court ought
to be "chary" about embracing merely speculative doctrines, not founded on
the text of the Constitution, to hold invalid action that does have roots in the
text. Special considerations, moreover, bespeak judicial caution when the Court
is asked to umpire a contest between the political branches. The Constitution
is not anything like a clear guide to decision in many situations of this sort
and compromise between the other branches may be a promising alternative
to judicial action. When, however, one gets to the interpretation of express
prohibitions upon legislative action there is a strong case for liberal inter-
pretation of the prohibitions, for judicial activism, if you will.
In developing his thesis as to constitutional prohibitions, Mr. Black chooses
to focus on the Bill of Rights and makes the surprising observation that the
prohibitions in the original Constitution are of relatively small importance. Is
this the way to classify such features as the qualified prohibition upon suspen-
sion of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the ban on ex post facto
laws?
The case for liberal construction of the provisions of the Bill of Rights is
supported by a series of arguments. Reliance is placed upon their express
formulation and their design to restrict as contrasted with enablement, as well
as the practical ground that narrow interpretation would render them empty.
The prohibitions, moreover, and this is particularly significant, give expres-
sion to basic affirmative values.
A number of pages are devoted to answering unidentified proponents of the
view that interpretation of the Bill of Rights requires making of policy judg-
ments, a function for which a court is not suited. This looks like a straw man.
It is true that there is contention over the question whether the unqualified
prohibitions should be regarded as absolute, as Justice Black insists,16 or
whether a legislative policy of safeguarding national security by imposing
some restraint on free speech, for example, should be reviewed on a balancing
of interests approach. There is no reference at this juncture, however, to that
controversy.
Finally, the author staunchly supports the consistency of criticizing the old
Court for judicial activism in reaching conclusions adverse to congressional
power to regulate economic life and espousing judicial activism in the inter-
pretation of the Bill of Rights. As he points out, the old Court had developed
an expanded concept of substantive due process which would largely preclude
government regulation of private business. It had drawn on political theory,
in the absence of constitutional text, to find limitations on such powers as that
to regulate interstate and foreign commerce. That there were the stated
16. Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U.L. Rlv. 865 (1960).
1961]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
grounds for criticizing the old Court for judicial activism does not mean that
all judicial activism is wrong.
With respect to judicial review of state action, the author notes again that
both checking and legitimatizing functions are served, but observes that here
the checking function is the more important. He first traverses some very
familiar and well-plowed ground as to the superior position, as law, of the
Federal Constitution, and the responsibility of the Court under law enacted
by Congress, beginning in 1789, to pass ultimately on the question whether
state action violates the Constitution. He is patient enough to respond to the
states rights argument that, as to the scope of state power, each state may
finally interpret the Constitution for itself. This reviewer thinks it enough to
say, as did Mr. Black, at the outset, that this is inconsistent with the very
conception of a Federal Union. The Union could not survive if national in-
terest could be subordinated to state and local interest through independent
and final state interpretation of the Constitution. "[ N] ational matters must be
passed on by somebody who speaks for the nation."'17
Mr. Black considers the alternative of congressional responsibility for deter-
mining constitutional questions as to state power. What he comes down to is
the inappropriateness of a legislative organ, suited for a power struggle in
making policy determinations, for the function of interpreting the Constitution
as law in particular cases.
He turns to the public school desegregation cases in connection with the
charge that the Court has been guilty of violating traditional modes and of
usurpation. As he observes, the legal question in those cases was a simple one
-whether a person under the jurisdiction of a state had been denied "the
equal protection of the laws" by governmental action. It was perfectly proper
grist for the judicial mill, whatever the critics may think of the decisions. He
did not bother to point out that all the insistent talk about invasion of a state's
control of public education misses the mark entirely. The equal protection
clause is designed to operate in areas of undeniable state jurisdiction; it
simply forbids unequal treatment in the exercise of that jurisdiction.
Even from the standpoint of legitimation of state action, review by the
Court is said to be necessary. One who claims that a state criminal law is ex
post facto and, thus, violative of the Constitution is not going to be satisfied
as to the legitimacy of a final state court ruling adverse to the federal claim.
Actually, moreover, the course of decision in the Court has not been unfavor-
able, on the whole, to state power. In the field of regulation of economic
activity it has been quite favorable. There is, of course, the Erie doctrine, 8
17. P. 142.
18. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). The author states the doctrine, on
p. 31 and again on p. 152, to be that henceforth federal courts were to be bound by state
court holdings on matters of state law. This is imprecise. In the interpretation of state
statutes the Court had never, even as to statutes codifying commercial law, departed from
the idea that state court interpretation was controlling. See, e.g., Burns Mortgage Co. v.
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too, but, one must note, it can be rationalized short of constitutional inter-
pretation.' 9 It must be acknowledged, of course, that the Court has been more
vigorous with respect to questions affecting human rights.
Do the insights into the judicial process that legal realism affords call for
a rejection of judicial review by the Court? Mr. Black feels called upon to
respond to this question. He has no doubt that the realists are right in reject-
ing the traditional notion that a judge has no role in making policy, but that
his function is to employ technical reason and book research to identify the
determinate rule that governs the case at hand and, then, to apply it. He
accepts the proposition that the judicial process in constitutional interpretation
and elsewhere, commonly involves situations as to which there is no single
determinate answer and makes it unavoidable that the judge act consciously
or unconsciously on policy. But he remains undisturbed. It was this way in
fact in Marshall's day, even though there were no legal realists around to ex-
plain it, and he "allows" that the record looks pretty good. There is no escape
from the problem in constitutional interpretation. The process calls both for
wisdom and lawyer competence since both policy and technical legal factors
are involved. Who is better qualified than a court made up of judges with
these elements, working in a developed tradition with institutional continuity?
Certainly not Congress, both because the members are not chosen on a basis
having any direct relation to qualification for constitutional decision and be-
cause the institution operates in an atmosphere of pressure and compromise.
W\hen he comes to examine attacks on the judicial power more deliberately,
Mr. Black considers both attacks in Congress and the judicial self-restraint
formula. He does a devastating job on the proposal in the Jenner-Butler bill
of 1958 that the Court be denied appellate jurisdiction of cases involving state
action as to admission to the bar.20 The proponents had been aroused by
recent decisions in two cases involving inquiry into political beliefs of persons
seeking admission to the bar.21 Their remedy, as Black observes, would leave
a state free, without federal control, to deny admission to the bar on the
ground of race or religion or political belief. ". . . uncontrolled power over
anything is uncontrolled power over everything."2 2 Carry control over lawyers
far enough and civil liberty and civil rights will be in grave peril.
It is the judicial self-restraint approach, however, which is marked as the
greatest threat. It is a quieter one
Fried, 292 U.S. 487 (1934). As for the unwritten law, Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16
Pet.) 1 (1842), permitted independent federal court declaration of state law only in the
areas of commercial law and general jurisprudence. Erie overruled Swift.
19. 304 U.S. at 90 (Reed, J., concurring).
20. S. 2646, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958). The bill was introduced by Senator Jenner.
Senator Butler joined as sponsor of a modified version.
21. Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners of New Mexico, 353 U.S. 232 (1957);
Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 352 U.S. 252 (1957).
22. P. 189.
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• . . working within the legal profession, in the pages of the law re-
views, in those self-doubts which the judges, like all other honest men in
power, must recurrently feel. The people who are conducting this offen-
sive of corrosion rarely speak of the total abolition of judicial review. In-
stead, they find reason after reason, in one area of law after another, for
disapproving of its exercise in any manner remotely related to the logic
of its origin and basis. And when we go to the pains of putting all these
fields of law and all these reasons together, the institution of judicial re-
view has somehow faded out of the picture-or, what is far worse, has
been converted into a mere ritual of acquiescence, or in plainer terms a
solemn if not particular pious fraud.
23
Here again the author does not identify contemporary exponents of this think-
ing. Instead, he goes back to James Bradley Thayer and an 1893 article of
Thayer, which he finds to have something of a current vogue.24 He quotes a
passage from Thayer, which concluded with the following sentence as to the
role of a court in exercising judicial review: "It can only disregard the Act
when those who have the right to make laws have not merely made a mistake,
but have made a very clear one,-so clear that it is not open to rational ques-
tion." The Black view is that the Thayer rule is supported neither by precedent
nor practice and is actually the very negation of judicial review. Take Thayer
literally and where are you? In the constitutional cases which reach the Court
there are certainly counsel of some competence on both sides. Can it be said
that in any of the cases in which decisions adverse to constitutionality have
been rendered the losing parties and counsel were supporting views that were
wrong beyond rational question? Suppose one judge dissented?
Black reviews the cases relied upon by Thayer and finds no support for him
in what was decided in those cases. Be that as it may, one can readily agree
that the practice does not accord with the Thayer rule. The Court does not
approach constitutional questions lightly; it has "rules of administration" de-
signed to confine determination of constitutional issues to situations where
that is found to be essential to proper disposition of the cases. But when the
issue cannot be avoided the decision is on the merits of the constitutional
question.
The Thayer view is found wanting in policy for the fundamental reason that
it is at odds with the central idea of the Constitution as law. If it is law the
Court has to determine its application and in doing so must wrestle with what-
ever doubts there may be.
One can find some fault with this book on the score, for example, that it
sets up intellectual straw men, who are reduceable to the "absurd," without
getting in clear sight of the real enemy.25 That detracts but little from its great
23. P. 191.
24. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law,
7 HARv. L. REv. 129 (1893).
25. As already noted with respect to the Erie case, the book suffers some from im-
precision, A further example is the reference to the case of Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350
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merit. The substance of the argument for judicial review is excellent and
eminently worthy of presentation.
JEFFERSON B. FORDHAMt
FEDERAL INCOmE TAXATION OF COR.PORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS. By Boris
I. Bittker. Federal Tax Press, 1959. Pp. xxiv, 422. $15.00, Student Edition,
$5.00.
THE provisions of the federal income tax statutes specifically applicable to
transactions of corporations and shareholders have long been thought to be
particularly complex and subtle. This appraisal may have been an instance of
transferred characterization in its origin. The corporate transactions to which
the tax statutes related have often been both intricate in their mechanisms and
subtle in their legal and financial operation, as any study of corporate finance
and reorganization will witness. The structure and mechanisms of the cor-
porate provisions of the Revenue Acts for the decade from 1924 until 1934
were relatively simple. Whether this was the simplicity of inadequacy or the
simplicity of a well-conceived and efficient functionalism is another matter.
The Revenue Act of 1934 initiated a process of elaboration and differentiation,
a process which has since moved at a pace quickening as though in its own
career to verify Henry Adams' Dynamic Theory of History and Law of Ac-
celeration. Indeed, with the enactment of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954
and subsequent amendments, it might be said of this process, as Adams said
of power, that it "seemed to have outgrown its servitude and to have asserted
its freedom."' Does one detect voices asserting, if not yet in the accents of
anger and alarm that Adams heard, "that the new forces must at any cost be
brought under control"?2
In more muted tones Professor Bittker's Preface appears to suggest such
ideas:
The Internal Revenue Code has recently been brought to the workshops
of Congress for repairs and alterations with increasing frequency, and
with each visit, its basic structure becomes more obscure. Despite this, I
believe that enough landmarks remain for a guidebook to serve a useful
function-and perhaps even to help in turning the attention of interested
persons away from details and toward our major problems, a shift of
focus that is a pre-condition to statutory reform.3
One might press further and question whether there remains anything of
structure, or only segments, if by structure one implies some coherence of pat-
U.S. 497 (1956), in which Smith Act supersession of a Pennsylvania anti-sedition law
was determined as to sedition against the United States. Black says" the court held that
there was complete supersession. P. 135.
tDean, University of Pennsylvania Law School.
1. ADAMs, THE EDUCATION OF HENRY ADnms 499 (1918).
2. Ibid.
3. P.v.
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